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Summary
Tolls are frequently discussed policies to reduce traffic in cities. However, road pricing mea-
sures are seldom implemented due to high investments and unpopularity. Transportation plan-
ning tools can support planning authorities by solving those problems if they take into account
the following aspects:
– Demographic attributes like income and time constraints
– Time reactions to the policy
– Schedule changes of population’s individuals during the whole day
Our approach uses multi-agent simulations to model and simulate full daily plans. Each of our
agents has a utility function that appraises the performance of a typical, microscopically si-
mulated day. The sum of all utility changes to a policy change can be interpreted as the change
in the system’s welfare thus the economic evaluation of a measure straightforward.
The approach is tested with travel behavior of the Zurich metropolitan region in Switzerland.
Several tolling schemes are investigated. It is shown that the simulation can be used to model
travelers’ reactions to time-dependent tolls in a way most existing transportation planning
tools are not able to do. It is demonstrated that route adjustment only, as is done in many
traditional transport planning packages, results in no economic gains from the tolls. As
time-dependent tolls are a much-debated subject in transportation politics, the ability to fully
model such tolls and the reactions of travelers may help to find better toll schemes. In a world
where individuals have more and more freedom to schedule their daily plans, agent-based si-
mulations offer an intuitive way to research complex topics with lots of interdependencies.
1 Introduction
In many cities in Europe, tolls are discussed as a means to reduce the amount of traffic
during peak hours or in a city in general. But only few cities (e.g. Singapore, Bergen,
Trondheim, Durham, London, Stockholm, Bologna, Roma) have implemented a toll
scheme, as tolling requires substantial upfront investment and is likely to be an unpop-
ular policy. In addition, the relatively simple and theoretically optimal marginal social
cost pricing approach normally does not work in complicated reality, since many pre-
conditions for the mathematical validity are violated. As a consequence, one resorts to
“second-best” pricing, for which, however, more complicated models and analyses are
needed (Verhoef 2002). Thus, there is an interest in transportation planning tools and
traffic models to thoroughly test different toll schemes to find one that solves one’s pro-
blems best – and provides hints about popular acceptance.
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Traditional transportation planning tools work macroscopically, distributing static traf-
fic flows onto a network (e.g. Ortu`zar/Willumsen 1995). While this is a well-established
technology, it is not able to model all aspects that are of interest when modelling tolls. In
particular, they usually lack any meaningful representation of the time-of-day dynamics.
The models usually calculate traffic flows for a complete day, or at best for certain per-
iods (morning peak, evening peak), but in all cases without any feedbacks between the
different times-of-day. This makes it difficult or impossible to model time-dependent
tolls, as the reaction of the travellers (e.g. driving before/after the toll) cannot be captured
endogenously within the planning model, but must be pre-specified by the analyst, pos-
sibly using elasticities (Winter/von Hirschhausen 2006). This reduces the usefulness of
such a tool enormously.
Dynamic traffic assignment (DTA) explicitly models the temporal dynamics of traffic
over the day (Chang et al. 1985, Ben-Akiva et al. 1998, Bliemer 2003). Demand, how-
ever, is typically given as fixed-period (e.g. hourly) origin-destination (OD) matrices,
and, in consequence, does not adapt to the toll. Adaptation would need to happen in
the demand generation modules that generate the OD matrices, but that implies rather
intricate coupling between demand generation and DTA. In addition, the DTA is no long-
er aware of traveller characteristics, such as income or time constraints, and, in conse-
quence, cannot base any kind of toll route acceptance/rejection decision on such attri-
butes.
A partial way out is offered by the approach chosen within METROPOLIS (de Palma/
Marchal 2002), which selects departure times of trips based on desired arrival times and
schedule delay penalties. Given a time-dependent toll, travellers can react by selecting
new departure times. A remaining problem is, however, the fact that trips and in con-
sequence, decisions are not related to demographics. In addition, every model that uses
single trips will have problems predicting useful reactions of travellers that span the
whole day. This is because trips in real life are embedded in a complete day plan and
are not meaningful just as stand-alone trips. Trips lead people from one activity to an-
other, and in most cases the activities have a higher importance in the daily schedule than
the trips do: Stores have opening and closing times, work places have fixed times when
one has to be present, a full-time employee has to work about eight hours a day. This
means that travellers cannot escape a toll at will, but have to trade off between different
utilities (working eight hours, being at a shop when it has opened, etc.) and disutilities
(paying a toll, being late for work, etc.). Thus, a toll may influence the complete daily
schedule of a person, and not only the period when the toll is charged.
Our approach uses multi-agent simulations to model and simulate full daily plans. The
agents are generated as a synthetic version of the real population living in the area of
interest, matching as many demographic attributes as are available. Every agent then
plans his/her day. These plans are simultaneously executed in the synthetic world,
and the interaction between the agents (e.g. congestion) is computed. Agents are then
given a chance to modify their plans, the plans are executed again, etc., that is, the agents
adapt (co-evolution; see, e.g., Hofbauer/Sigmund 1998). Since the agents are virtual re-
presentations of real people, and since they move in a virtual representation of the real
world, aspects of reality such as those discussed in the previous paragraph can be in-
cluded in a conceptually straightforward way.
Each of our agents has a (possibly individual) utility function, based on the agent’s per-
formance during plan execution (i.e. including interaction). This utility function plays
the same role as the fitness function in co-evolutionary genetic algorithms: Every agent
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attempts to improve his/her fitness, which, however, is based on the behaviour of the
other agents. In consequence, changes in an agent’s utility in reaction to a policy change
can be directly interpreted as if and how much the agent benefits from the policy change,
which allows to identify winners and losers of a policy measure. Since agents can adapt,
their utility change reflects indirect utility: the utility change after agents have optimally
adapted to the new circumstances. This adaptation takes place along those choice dimen-
sions that are allowed by the simulation system, thus allowing fine-grained control over
the adaptive reactions that are to be included into the scenario. Since utility is based on
the performance in the synthetic world, it is conceptually straightforward to include con-
straints such as opening times: If an agent remains at a facility while the facility is closed,
no utility will be accumulated during that time, and thus the agent will most probably
search for a different time structure for his/her day.
As the change of the utility of an agent is the change of her/his personal performance, the
(weighted) sum of all utility changes in reaction to a policy change is, in consequence, the
change in the system’s welfare. That is, the input of “user benefits” to a cost-benefit
analysis can be taken directly from the simulation, and is therefore automatically con-
sistent with the assumptions about the agents’ optimization capabilities. This is in stark
contrast to the traditional approach, where there is one model in which the agents react
to a policy change, and a second model that assigns economic valuations to those
changes. That approach completely separates the agents’ optimization behaviour
from the measurement of the economic benefit, thus making it difficult if not impossible
to keep those consistent.
The approach described in this paper is meant to evaluate/appraise approaches that are
designed by other means. There are other approaches, such as by Markose et al. (2007)
or Zhang and Levinson (2007), which concentrate on finding optimal designs, using
agent-based approaches on the supply side. The emphasis of the present paper, in con-
trast, is on the travellers’ behavioural realism, which we intend to improve much further
in the near future. Ultimately, however, it is probable that the two approaches, supply-
side agents on the one hand, and improved behavioural realism on the demand side, will
merge.
This paper describes the agent-based approach in more detail. Section 2 describes the
overall approach, concentrating on conceptual aspects, the co-evolutionary adaptation,
and the scoring. Section 3 then describes a specific scenario, related to an illustrative
study using data from the Zurich metropolitan area. The scenario consists of the geo-
graphic and socio-demographic input data, the computational modules, the toll scheme,
and the specific simulation runs that were undertaken. In principle, the computational
details should be rather unimportant, since agents are assumed to adapt optimally in the
choice dimensions that are included in the simulation. In practice, however, at this point
little is known about the robustness of these results, and for that reason more details are
given. Section 4 describes the results of the toll simulation, in particular the reaction pat-
terns that emerge. An important result is that agents react also outside tolled times – as
they should. Section 5, finally, comes back to the economic analysis that was shortly
sketched in the previous paragraphs.
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2 Simulation structure
2.1 Overview
Our simulation is constructed around agents that make independent decisions about
their actions. Each traveler of the real system is modeled as an individual agent in
our simulation. The overall approach consists of three important pieces:
– Each agent independently obtains a plan, which encodes its intentions during a certain
time period, typically a day.
– All agents’ plans are simultaneously executed in the simulation of the physical system.
This is also called the traffic flow simulation (and sometimes the mobility simulation).
– There is a mechanism that allows agents to learn. In our implementation, the system
iterates between plan generation and traffic flow simulation. The system remembers
several plans per agent, and scores the performance of each plan. Agents normally
chose the plan with the highest score, sometimes re-evaluate plans with bad scores
to test if it now performs better, and sometimes obtain new plans. For the purposes
of this paper, a “score” is the same as a “utility”. Further details will be given below.
A plan contains the itinerary of activities the agent wants to perform during the day, plus
the intervening trips the agent must travel between activities (see Figure 1). An agent’s
plan details the order, type, location, duration and other time constraints of each activity,
and the mode, route and expected departure and travel times of each trip. This paper
concentrates on “home” and “work” as the only activities, and “car” as the only
mode. Our implementation supports additional activity types (see, e.g., Meister et al.
2006) and additional modes of transport, but more time is needed to validate results
given those additional complexities.
The task of generating a plan is divided into sets of decisions, and each set is assigned to a
separate module. An agent strings together calls to various modules in order to build up a
complete plan. To support this incremental process, the input to a given module is a
(possibly incomplete) plan, and the output is a plan with one or more decisions added.
This paper will make use of two modules only: “activity time generator” and “router”.
Other modules are under investigation, and will be the topic of future publications. Once
all agents’ plans have been constructed, they can be fed into the traffic flow simulation.
The traffic flow simulation module executes all agents’ plans simultaneously on the net-
work, allowing agents to interact with one another, and provides output describing what
happened to the agents during the execution of their plans.
The outcome of the traffic flow simulation (e.g. congestion) depends on the planning
decisions made by the agents and their decision-making modules. However, those mod-
ules can base their decisions on the output of the traffic flow simulation (e.g. knowledge
of congestion). This creates an interdependency (“chicken and egg”) problem between
the decision-making modules and the traffic flow simulation. To solve this, feedback is
introduced into the multi-agent simulation structure (Kaufman et al. 1991, Bottom
Figure 1 A “plan” in XML format. For the purposes of the
present paper, a “leg” is the same as a “trip”
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2000). This sets up an iteration cycle which runs the traffic flow simulation with specific
plans for the agents, then uses the planning modules to update the plans; these changed
plans are again fed into the traffic flow simulation, etc, until consistency of the results is
reached. The feedback cycle is controlled by the agent database, which also keeps track
of multiple plans generated by each agent, allowing agents to reuse those plans at will.
The iteration cycles coupled with the agent database enable the agents to learn how to
improve their plans over many iterations.
2.2 Co-evolutionary adaptation
The iterative approach outlined above describes co-evolutionary adaptation: Every agent
attempts to improve, while everybody around him/her is doing the same. Several con-
ceptual issues are related to this concept:
– If the adaptation ever came to an end (to a fixed point), and if the whole system were
deterministic, then the system would be in a Nash equilibrium: No agent could im-
prove by unilaterally doing something else. This notion is important, since it relates
our work to standard game theory. There is, however, no guarantee that the Nash
equilibrium is unique; i.e., depending on the initial conditions and on the exact nature
of the adaptation process, different fixed points might be reached (Hofbauer/Sigmund
1998, Watling 1999). Clearly, the possibility of multiple outcomes is important in pol-
icy contexts.
– There is not even a need that such a system goes to a fixed point at all. Other pos-
sibilities are cycles or chaotic attractors (Hofbauer/Sigmund 1998, Watling 1999).
– Our system, however, is not deterministic. Although this is probably more realistic,
and makes the system more robust, it makes the interpretation more complicated. One
could argue that the system is ergodic (roughly: it eventually visits all possible system
states) and should thus go to a steady state phase space density (Cantarella/Cascetta
1995). Yet, the phase space is huge and our typical iteration numbers comparatively
small, and thus an instance of pseudo-stability (Watling 1996) or “broken” ergodicity
(Palmer 1989) is much more probable. This means that the iterations might find a
situation that is (apart from fluctuations) locally stable, but there is no guarantee
that running the iterations longer might not lead to completely different solutions.
In this paper, such a situation will be called “relaxed”.
The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution of traditional transport modeling was
one of its most important features: Although static assignment does not necessarily have
much to do with reality especially in heavily congested situations, at least it allows a
conceptually sound comparison of different policy scenarios. Multi-agent simulations
do not possess this uniqueness property, as can be shown already with simple but plau-
sible examples (Daganzo 1998). It is as of yet unclear what the agent-based models will
be able to put forward instead. One possibility is to not only consider the relaxed state,
but also to pay closer attention to the realism of the initial condition and the adaptation
behavior itself. Such models, then, would attempt to predict the full dynamic trajectory
of the learning behavior of the simulated population when faced with a policy or infra-
structure change.
2.3 Scores (¼ utilities) of plans
In order for adaptation to work in a meaningful way, it is necessary to be able to compare
the performance of different plans. This is easiest achieved by assigning scores to plans.
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This is the same as the fitness function in genetic algorithms, or the objective function in
optimization problems. Note once more that every agent has its own scoring function,
and attempts to optimize for itself.
In principle, arbitrary scoring schemes can be used (e.g. prospect theory, Avineri/Prash-
ker 2003). Much of the approach, in fact, would still function even if agents were only
able to rank plans. In this work, a utility-based approach is used, and therefore the word
“score” is replaced by “utility” in the following. The approach is related to the Vickrey
bottleneck model (Arnott et al. 1993), but is modified in order to be consistent with our
approach based on complete daily plans (Charypar/Nagel 2005, Raney/Nagel 2006).
The elements of our approach are as follows:
– the total utility of a plan is computed as the sum of individual contributions:
Utotal ¼
Xn
i¼1
Uperf ;i þ
Xn
i¼1
Ulate;i þ
Xn
i¼1
Utravel;i
where Utotal is the total utility for a given plan; n is the number of activities, which equals
the number of trips, as we consider the stay at home before the first departure the same as
the stay at home after the last arrival; Uperf ;i is the (positive) utility earned for performing
activity i; Ulate;i is the (negative) utility earned for arriving late to activity i; and Utravel;i is
the (negative) utility earned for traveling during trip i. In order to work in plausible real-
world units, utilities are measured in Euro.
– a logarithmic form is used for the positive utility earned by performing an activity:
Uperf ;iðtperf ;iÞ ¼ bperf  t*;i  ln
tperf ;i
t0;i
 
where tperf is the actual performed duration of the activity, t* is the “typical” duration of
an activity, and bperf is the marginal utility of an activity at its typical duration. bperf is the
same for all activities, since in equilibrium (and in the absence of constraints) all activities
at their typical duration need to have the same marginal utility (since otherwise an agent
could gain by expanding the activity with the largest marginal utility while shrinking the
activity with the smallest marginal utility). bperf is, in fact, the (marginal) opportunity
cost of time, since it is the utility that is foregone when “nothing” is done (also see below
the discussion re “coming early/waiting”).
t0;i is a scaling parameter that is related both to the minimum duration and to the im-
portance of an activity. If the actual duration falls below t0;i, then the utility contribution
of the activity becomes negative, implying that the agent should rather completely drop
that activity. This paper uses t0; i ¼ t*;i  expðf=t*;iÞ where f is a scaling constant set to
10 hours. With this specific form, Uperf ;iðt*;iÞ ¼ bperf  f is independent of the activity
type.
– The (dis)utility of being late is uniformly assumed as: Ulate;i ¼ blate  tlate;i, where blate is
the marginal utility (in Q/h; usually negative) for being late, and tlate;i is the duration of
being late to activity j.
– The (dis)utility of traveling is uniformly assumed as: Utravel;i ¼ btravel  ttravel;i, where
btravel is the marginal utility (in Q/h; usually negative) for travel, and ttravel;i is the num-
ber of hours spent traveling during trip i.
In principle, arriving early or leaving early could also be punished. There is, however, no
immediate need to punish early arrival, since waiting times are already indirectly pun-
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ished by foregoing the reward that could be accumulated by doing an activity instead
(opportunity cost). In consequence, the effective (dis)utility of waiting is already
bperf . Similarly, that opportunity cost has to be added to the time spent traveling, arriv-
ing at an effective (dis)utility of traveling of jbtravelj  bperf . In contrast, no opportunity
cost needs to be added to late arrivals, because the late arrival time is spent somewhere
else. In consequence, the effective (dis)utility of arriving late remains at blate.
These values (bperf ; bperf þ jbtravelj, and jblatej) are the values that would correspond to
the values of the parameters of the Vickrey model (Vickrey 1969, Arnott et al. 1993) if
our simulation would just look for late arrival.
2.4 Discussion of the utility function
The above scoring function seems to be rather complicated, and seems to have many
parameters. In the investigations presented in this paper, however, activities cannot
be dropped, and therefore several aspects become unimportant. Take, for example, a
person with a daily plan that consists of “home” and “work” only, with typical durations
of t*;home ¼ 16h and t*;work ¼ 8h. When home and work are at the same locations, the
person can be “at home” for 16 hours, and work for 8 hours, and that is the optimal
solution, since the marginal utilities for both activities at these durations are equal.
Note that the marginal utilities need to be decreasing (i.e. utilities need to be concave),
because otherwise that optimum would not be unique and stable.
When home and work are not at the same location, the person needs to travel between
the locations. The time for travel will eat with into the 16 h at home and into the 8 h at
work. With small travel times, the reduction of these times will be approximately the
same, since the marginal utilities are the same. With larger travel times, however, the
curvature of the utility function will play a role, and the utility function with the stronger
curvature will give up less time. A work duration that is strongly anchored near the 8 h
would, therefore, be modelled with a t0;work only slightly smaller than t*;work, while a
home duration this is not strongly anchored near the 16 h would be modelled with a
t0;work considerably smaller than t*;work. This would lead to a result where the travel
time would mostly be taken away from the time at home.
Overall, this implies the following for the investigation described in this paper:
– It is plausible to assume that utility functions are increasing and concave in the neigh-
bourhood of the “typical durations” of the activities. Beyond these restrictions, the
specific form of the function does not matter.
– As long as external constraints (e.g. work hour regulations, shop opening times) do not
play an overarching role, marginal utilities at the typical durations should be the same
at all activities. They might, however, vary from person to person, corresponding to
different values of time.
– The curvature of the utility function at the typical duration is needed separately for
each activity type.
This implies that any function that allows setting the slope and the curvature at a given
“typical duration” should lead to similar results – typical candidate functions for this are
log, power-laws, or second-degree polynomials. The parameters to be estimated are the
following: (i) typical durations for each activity type; (ii) one marginal utility parameter
for all activities, which also relates the utility of time to the utility of money; (iii) cur-
vatures of the utility functions at the typical durations for each activity type. With respect
to typical durations (i) and the opportunity cost of time (ii), one can have some confi-
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dence that they can be estimated from time use surveys (e.g. Stinson, 1999): Considerable
progress has been made by Jara-Dı´az and Guerra (2003) and Jara-Dı´az et al. (2007) con-
cerning the methodology of estimating utility functions for complete days, including the
income-dependency of the parameters. (iii) is more problematic, and the sensitivity of the
results to the choice of the parameters needs to be systematically tested. Yet, given the
abundance of time-use data, one can have some confidence that useful estimations will
eventually be possible.
In addition, disutilities for travelling and for being late need to be derived. There is con-
siderable work on disutilities for travelling, usually framed as “value of time” investiga-
tions. A problem is that, as explained above, two disutilities need to be added, one that is
simply the opportunity cost of time, and one that is the additional disutility of travelling.
A second problem is that estimations from discrete choice theory, abundant in travel
behaviour research, measure indirect utility (e.g. Bates 2006), while what is needed
for our simulations is direct utility. Once more, given the results of Jara-Dı´az et al.,
one can have some confidence that these issues will eventually be resolved.
With respect to the disutility of being late, the value used in our current investigations is
ad-hoc, simply mirroring the famous value of Vickrey. There is, however, agreement in
the transport community that especially for home-to-work trips, some kind of penalty
for being late makes sense. The parameters can, in principle, be estimated from surveys
concerning the willingness-to-pay for a more reliable transport system (e.g. Chen et al.
2002).
3 Scenario
In this section, a specific scenario will be described in some detail. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate the more general concepts described above, but also to provide
some intuition as to what is feasible when dealing with real world scenarios.
3.1 Geographical area; population; initial demand
The scenario covers the area of Zurich (Switzerland) with about 1 m inhabitants. The
network is a Swiss regional planning network, extended with the major European transit
corridors (Figure 2a). It has the fairly typical size of 10564 nodes and 28624 links.
The simulated demand consists only of commuters that travel by car in the aforemen-
tioned region, resulting in 260275 agents. For the results presented here, all travellers
will have a simplified activity pattern of home-work-home. This is done for illustration
and for verification purposes; future studies will contain full activity chains. The initial
time structure has the agents leaving home in the morning at a randomly chosen time
between 6 am and 9 am, work for 8 hours, and then returning to home.
3.2 Computational modules
A specific scenario always comes together with a specific selection of aspects that are
included in the modeling, together with specific computational modules that are
used. In the following sections, we describe the modules in more detail. Further research
is needed in order to estimate how important the details of these modules are. Regarding
the traffic flow simulation, which represents the physical reality, it should be possible to
eventually come up with a calibrated and validated model that describes that physical
reality in sufficient detail; and in fact, our own experience (unpublished) indicates that
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the results do not hinge critically on the selection of the traffic flow simulation. Yet, also
the selection of the decision modules should, as long as they are able to scan the search
space in a meaningful way, not be absolutely critical, since it is the scoring function de-
scribed above that ultimately determines the agents’ behavior. There is indeed some in-
dication that simple mental modules, together with many iterations (¼ very long com-
puting times), can lead to plausible results (Nagel et al. 2004, Balmer et al. 2005). Yet,
the issue of computing times remains important (Meister et al. 2006, Charypar et al.
2006).
3.2.1 Activity time allocation module
This module is called to change the timing of an agent’s plan. At this point, a very simple
approach is used which applies random “mutations” to the duration and end time at-
tributes of the agent’s activities. For each such attribute of each activity in an agent’s plan,
this module picks a random time from the uniform distribution [ 30 min, + 30 min] and
adds it to the attribute. Any negative duration is reset to zero; any activity end time after
midnight is reset to midnight.
Although this approach is naive, it is sufficient in order to obtain useful results. This is
consistent with our overall assumption that, to a certain extent, simple modules can be
used in conjunction with a large number of learning iterations (e.g. Nagel et al. 2004).
Since each module is implemented as a “plug-in”, this module can be replaced by a more
sophisticated implementation if desired. A more sophisticated scheduling module is al-
ready available (Meister et al. 2006). After appropriate testing, this will be used in future
studies.
3.2.2 Router
The router is implemented as a time dependent Dijkstra algorithm. It calculates link tra-
vel times from the events output of the previous traffic flow simulation (see next section).
The link travel times are encoded in 15 minute time bins, so they can be used as the
weights of the links in the network graph. Apart from relatively small and essentially
technical details, the implementation of such an algorithm is straightforward (Jacob
et al. 1999, Lefebvre/Balmer 2007). With this and the knowledge about activity chains,
it computes the fastest path from each activity to the next one in the sequence as a func-
tion of departure time.
3.2.3 Traffic flow simulation
The traffic flow simulation simulates the physical world. It is implemented as a queue
simulation, which means that each street (link) is represented as a FIFO (first-in first-out)
queue with two restrictions (Gawron 1998, Cetin et al. 2003): First, each agent has to
remain for a certain time on the link, corresponding to the free-flow speed travel time.
Second, a link storage capacity is defined which limits the number of agents on the link. If
it is filled up, no more agents can enter this link.
Even though this structure is indeed very simple, it produces traffic as expected and it can
run directly off the data typically available for transportation planning purposes. On the
other hand, there are some limitations compared to reality, i.e. number of lanes, weaving
lanes, turn connectivities across intersections or signal schedules cannot be included into
this model.
Multi-Agent Transport Simulations and Economic Evaluation . 181
The output that the traffic flow simulation produces is a list of events for each agent, such
as entering/leaving link, left/arrived at activity, and so on. Data for an event includes
which agent experienced it, what happened, at what time it happened, and where
(link/node) the event occurred. With this data it is easy to produce different kinds of
information and indicators like link travel time (which, e.g., will be used by the router),
trip travel time, trip length, percentage of congestion, and so on.
3.2.4 Agent database – feedback
As mentioned above, the feedback mechanism is important for making the modules con-
sistent with one another, and for enabling agents to learn how to improve their plans. In
order to achieve this improvement, agents need to be able to try out different plans and to
tell when one plan is “better” than another. The iteration cycle of the feedback mechan-
ism allows agents to try out multiple plans. To compare plans, the agents assign each plan
a “utility”, as explained above.
It is important to note that our framework always uses actual plan performance for the
utility. This is in stark contrast to all other similar approaches that we are aware of. These
other approaches always feed back some aggregated quantity such as link travel times
and reconstruct performance based on those (e.g. Waddell et al. 2003, Ettema et al.
2003). Because of unavoidable aggregation errors, such an approach can fail rather
badly, in the sense that the performance information derived from the aggregated infor-
mation may be rather different from the performance that the agent in fact experienced
(Raney/Nagel 2004).
The procedure of the feedback and learning mechanism is described in detail by Balmer et
al. (2005). For better understanding, the key points are restated here.
1. The agent database starts with one complete plan per agent, which is marked as “se-
lected”.
2. The simulation executes these selected plans simultaneously and outputs events.
3. Each agent uses the events to calculate the utility of its selected plan and decides which
plan to select for execution during the next iteration (traffic flow simulation). When
choosing a plan, the agent database can either
– create a new plan by sending an existing plan to the router, adding the modified plan as
a new plan and selecting it,
– create a new plan by sending an existing plan to the time allocation module, adding the
modified plan and selecting it,
– pick an existing plan from memory, choosing according to probabilities based on the
utilities of the plans. The probabilities are of the form pj ¼ ebUj=
P
i e
bUi , where Uj is
the utility of plan j, and b is an empirical constant. This is the familiar logit model (e.g.
Ben-Akiva/Lerman 1985).
4. Next, the simulation executes the newly selected plans, that is, it goes back to 2.
This cycle continues until the system has reached a relaxed state. At this point, there is no
quantitative measure of when the system is “relaxed”; we just allow the cycle to continue
until the outcome seems stable. In the long run, measures to stop the iterations automa-
tically and consistently need to be found.
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3.3 Tolls
To test the approach, two different road pricing policies were simulated: a “time toll”
where the toll amount to pay depends on the time spent driving, and a “city toll” which is
a distance-based charge for a certain area of Zurich. These will be explained in more
detail in the following.
3.3.1 Time toll
The time-based policy is introduced for all travellers 24 hours a day, for the whole si-
mulation area. For every hour spent on the road 12 Q are charged; the computation of the
toll is done in one-second increments. One could argue that this type of toll will never be
implemented in the real world because it provides an incentive to speed. Yet, in-car de-
vices for supervising speed limits are available (Garvill et al. 2003) and could, in prin-
ciple, be used together with such a toll. However, the main reason for using such a toll in
a scientific study is that it approximates the time-dependent optimal toll in the bottleneck
scenario analyzed by Arnott et al. (1990): The time toll is more expensive for links where,
and during time slots when, congestion is high. This becomes clear when one considers
that the free speed travel time, and any toll levied on it, is foregone anyway, since in the
set-up considered here the travellers can only adapt routes and times, i.e. they are forced
by the simulation set-up to make the car trips under all circumstances. Therefore, only
the time that comes on top of the free speed travel time is relevant for the decision-mak-
ing of the agent – and that time is now made “more expensive” by the toll.
3.3.2 City toll
As a more realistic scenario, a hypothetical toll area was defined that covers the Zurich
city area of administration, but not the motorways that lead into and partially around the
city. The exclusion of the motorways is plausible because they are owned by the Swiss
Confederation and not by the city of Zurich. This is a plausible scenario based on the
status of the political discussion in Switzerland (Bundesrat, 2007). We are not aware of
more specific politically discussed scenarios for Zurich; otherwise we would have used
(a) Switzerland network, area of Zurich enlarged (b) hypothetical toll links in Zurich area.
Figure 2 Scenario: Switzerland network with toll links for Zurich
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those. Figure 2(b) shows the area and the tolled links. The diameter of the toll area is
about 11 km. The toll is levied during morning rush hour, 7:15 am to 8:15 am, and is
set to 1 Q/km – in fact, toll levels of 0.5 Q/km, 1 Q/km, and 2 Q/km were tested and
out of those, the selected toll level yields the highest economic benefits (see below).
The tolled area has a high density of offices and other work places, so the in-bound traffic
is larger in the morning than the out-bound traffic, and vice versa in the evening.
3.4 Simulation runs
The simulation is run for 100 iterations to retrieve a relaxed state in which the initial
plans are adapted to the traffic conditions without any toll. Based on the hundredth ite-
ration we simulate 200 iterations for each policy and for a base case where no policy is
implemented. If not specified explicitly 10 % of the agents adapt routes and 10% adapt
activity times in each iteration. The following values for the parameters were used:
bperf ¼ þ6 Q=h; btravel ¼ 6 Q=h; blate ¼ 18 Q=h
As discussed earlier, these values mirror the standard values of the Vickrey scenario (e.g.
Arnott/de Palma/Lindsey 1993) although that is not obvious at first glance: An agent that
arrives early to an activity must wait for the activity to start, therefore forgoing the
bperf ¼ þ6 Q=h that it could accumulate instead. An agent that travels forgoes the
same amount, plus a loss of 6 Q/h for traveling. Finally, an agent that arrives late receives
a penalty of 18 Q/h.
The work activity’s starting time is defined as 8:00 am for all agents. This is, once more,
done to mirror the Vickrey scenario; more realistic values will be used in future studies.
The time toll is realized by increasing the penalty for traveling, btravel, from  6 Q per
hour to  18 Q per hour.
4 Results
In the following, we will present the results of three simulation runs comparing the base
case with the results of the time- and distance toll. Thus, we will show which modifica-
tions in travel behavior are evoked when the policies are implemented in our scenario.
4.1 Effects of the time toll
The time toll reinforces the incentive of our agents to minimize travel time. On the other
hand, there is still a strong incentive to start working at 08:00 am to avoid opportunity
costs for waiting in case of early arrival or the penalty for arriving late. Making travel
time more expensive means diminishing the influence of the schedule delay stimuli. Fig-
ure 3 shows the temporal distribution of the arrivals of agents at their activity locations
for the base case and the toll scenarios. Comparing the base case curve and the time toll
curve one can see that most of the agents still try to arrive at work at eight in the morning.
Some of them however are forced by the policy to arrive earlier than in the base case, i.e.
more agents arrive between 06:00 am and approx. 7:30.
Figure 4 shows the number of travelers simultaneously on the road for the different sce-
narios. The area below the curves can be interpreted as the total time agents spend on the
road. A smaller area, as obtained from the time toll, means that people spend less time
traveling: As some of the agents react to the toll, the available infrastructure is used more
184 . K. Nagel, D. Grether, U. Beuck, Y. Chen, M. Rieser and K.W. Axhausen
efficiently. The fact that arrival patterns are virtually unchanged (Figure 4) indicates that
these improvements are reached without distorting people’s schedules.
Both results are as expected: The optimal toll in the Vickrey bottleneck scenario changes
the departure pattern and reduces travel times, but it does not change the arrival pattern.
In consequence, it makes sense that a toll that approximates the optimal toll has the same
general effect. There are, however, also some differences: Figure 3 shows that the arrival
pattern is not tri-angular, but is more strongly peaked at the desired arrival time at 8 am.
This is the result of the fact that departure and arrival locations are scattered throughout
the region.
Figure 3 Number of arrivals of travelers over the time of day. The tolls
force some agents to arrive earlier
Figure 4 Number of travelers on the road over the time of day. With
the tolls, the travel time is reduced
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4.2 Effects of the city toll
As explained above, the city toll is a distance toll that is implemented only in the city area,
and only between 7:15 and 8:15 am. Based on the arrival time distribution (Figure 3) and
on the dynamics of the number of travellers on the road (Figure 4) one would say that its
effect is in between the base case and the time toll. In addition, there is a slight toll time
avoidance reaction in the morning. In contrast, there is virtually no effect in the evening.
This makes sense since, as the morning arrival pattern is not much changed, there is little
incentive to change anything in the evening when there is no city toll. This is in contrast
to the time toll which is charged also in the evening.
4.3 Route adaptation only
The agent-based approach allows to selectively switch on and off certain choice dimen-
sions of the travellers. In order to test this, additional runs were performed where the
time adaptation of the agents in reaction to the tolls was switched off. This means that all
departure times of the agents remain fixed also when the tolls are switched on – the
agents can only react by moving to other routes. With the time toll, it is clear that there
will be no reaction since the agents already use those routes that are fastest, given their
departure time. But also with the city toll, Figure 5 implies that there is little temporal
effect: The arrival time structure remains virtually unchanged, implying that the travel
times remain unchanged and the toll thus does not relieve congestion. When interpreting
these results, one should, however, keep in mind that in this set-up there is no elasticity of
demand. This will be included into future studies and will certainly influence the results.
4.4 Computational performance
The above runs need about 5 to 10 minutes of computing time per iteration; 100 itera-
tions thus need about half a day. These numbers seem to be valid on any modern com-
puter that we have tested, from laptops to workstations. Another element is memory. For
Figure 5 Number of arrivals of travelers over the time of day when no
time adaptation is possible. The curves are nearly equal thus most re-
actions to the policies are time reactions
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the simulations for this paper, consisting of 10 % of about 260,000 commuters, 2 GB of
memory are sufficient. A 100 % simulation of the Zurich region, with full activity chains,
takes about 20 GB of memory.
5 Economic interpretation
5.1 Economic appraisal
Standard economic appraisal, as is for example used for cost-benefit-analysis (e.g.
Pearce/Nash 1981), would now take the above traffic patterns as input, and attach eco-
nomic valuations to them. One would, for example, for each link count the number of
users and the average time they spent on the link. These numbers would then be com-
pared between the base case and the scenario case. Typically, the travel time for a link
would go down (say from t1 to t2) and the number of users would go up (say from n1 to
n2). The economic gain consists of two contributions (e.g. Pearce/Nash 1981, Button
1993):
– Gains by existing users: n1 (t1 – t2), where the economic interpretation is that this was
already the best option for those people before the modification of the system, and so
the improvement of the system is fully counted for those people.
– Gains by new users: (n2 – n1) (t1 – t2)/2, where the intuition is the following: New users
one by one switch to the facility when the travel time is slowly decreased. A user that is
switching is exactly neutral between two options. Any further improvement of the
facility after the switch is then counted as benefit to that user. The first user that
switches reaps nearly all the benefits from t1 to t2, while he last user that switches
reaps nearly no benefits; this is overall approximated by (t1 – t2)/2 (known as the
“rule of the half” in the literature).
The result of this procedure has a unit of time; it is then converted to monetary units by
multiplying it with a value of time.
5.2 Identifying winners and losers in the multi-agent simulation
It should be clear, however, that this is too simplistic for the above scenario. In particular,
the standard approach only counts travel time gains, but not schedule delay effects
(caused by people choosing a non-preferred time of travel to avoid the toll). However,
research indicates that schedule delay effects might contribute more than half of the eco-
nomic effects of well-chosen time-dependent tolls (Arnott et al. 1990). In addition, the
standard approach is unable to look at equity aspects of the toll, since it is not able to
differentiate between subgroups. Yet, equity effects, for example by age, income, gender,
or race, are increasingly becoming important in any discussion of policy measures. Fi-
nally, the approach needs to assume a uniform value of time for all travellers, since the
approach is not able to differentiate between trip purposes. Yet, it is well known that the
value of time may differ by a substantial factor between leisure trips and business trips
(for relevant Swiss results see Axhausen et al. (forthcoming), which also differentiates by
the length of the trip; see Jara-Diaz and Guevara (2003) for the problem of an equity-
adjusted value of time).
Fortunately, with our multi-agent simulation, it is, in fact, not necessary to add the eco-
nomic appraisal as it is conventionally done, since the agent utilities already are the eco-
nomic performance indicators of the system. This is because the utility is the measure
that every agent attempts to improve, and a higher utility directly measures the amount
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of improvement that an agent was able to reach. This automatically includes the schedule
delay effects, since every agent will have optimally adjusted to any trade-off between
time-dependent congestion, time-dependent toll, and schedule delay, including any per-
sonal restrictions that an agent may have, such as specific opening times. The multi-agent
approach could also include different values of time, since they would be included as
person-specific values of bperf , btravel, and blate.
It is, thus, immediately possible to identify winners and losers of a policy. An example of
such an analysis is Figure 6, which allocates the gains and losses after the introduction of
the time toll to the residential locations of the agents. The analysis includes uniform re-
distribution of the toll revenues. In this case, there are both winners and losers close to
Zurich, and mostly losers further away. The reason is that, far away from Zurich, only
long distance travelers are included in the analysis, and these lose because the time toll
punishes long distance travelers more, while the equal redistribution reimburses the same
amount to everybody. Apart from this, there does not seem to be any structure, implying
that any structure that there may be is not geographically oriented.
Figure 6 Spatial distribution of gains and losses of the time toll. Crosses: households with gains;
gray dots: households with losses. Households far away from Zurich lose because far away from
Zurich only households with long distance trips are included, and these consistently lose with
the time toll
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5.3 Aggregated economic benefits in the multi-agent simulation
For economic analysis, the gains and losses need to be aggregated. The simplest – uti-
litarian – way to do this is to sum up the utilities. The reasoning behind this would be that
the monetarized utilities reflect willingness to pay of each individual for the change of the
system by the policy (including the losers, which would need to receive money to accept),
and thus the sum of these utilities reflects the aggregated willingness to pay. Table 1
shows one such analysis, for the scenario described above. On the left, one finds different
entries for the base case. This is followed by two columns for the time toll, one depicting
the new numbers after the policy introduction, the other the differences to the base case.
This is followed by two columns of the same type for the city toll. For example, when
switching on the time toll, the average travel time (per day per agent) decreases from
3832 to 3466 seconds. Average utility decreases by 10.18 Q, including the utility loss
from the toll payment. Since, however, average toll payments are 11.55 Q, after redis-
tribution of the toll revenues there is an average utility gain of 1.37 Q. Multiplied by
the number of agents this results in 357,476 Q of utility gains per day.
The city toll reaches about 3/4 of those gains (284,058 Q), but with the advantages that
already before redistribution there is a slight gain, and much less money needs to be
moved around (less than 300,000 Q instead of more than 3 million Q) to obtain those
gains.
When interpreting those results, one should keep in mind that, although our goal is to
simulate realistic scenarios, the current example is still rather artificial: It is based on
simplified home-work-home activities only, and there is no alternative to travelling
by car (i.e. agents can neither decide to take an alternative mode nor to not travel at
all). Future studies will remove these restrictions.
Table 2 shows what happens if the simulation allows only route adaptation in reaction to
the toll. For the time toll, as expected the difference (after re-distribution of toll revenues)
Table 1 Different contributions to the agents’ utilities for the different scenarios
Base case Time toll Difference City toll Difference
Number of agents 260,890 260,890 0 260,890 0
Number of paying
agents
0 260,890 260,890 57,990 57,990
Travel time (avg.
per agent, sec.)
3,832 3,466  366 3,682  150
Utility (avg.
per agent, 3)
102.66 92.47  10.18 102.69 0.027
Utilities (sum, 3) 26,783,237 24,126,564  2,656,673 26,790,317 7,080
Toll paid (avg. per
paying agent, 3)
0.00 11.55 11.55 4.78 4.78
Toll paid (sum, 3) 0 3,014,149 3,014,149 276,978 276,978
Utility after redistri-
bution of toll (avg.
per agent, 3)
102.66 104.03 1.37 103.75 1.09
Utility after toll re-
distribution (sum, 3)
26,783,237 27,140,713 357,476 27,067,295 284,058
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is essentially zero – the remaining difference can be attributed to the stochastic elements
of the simulation. For the city toll, there are economic losses even after redistribution of
the toll ( 136,476 Q or  0.52 Q per agent). This is due to the fact that, with route adap-
tation only, the city toll will make people travel longer routes than without the toll. It is
difficult to construct a toll for a city setting that generates economic benefits only from
route adaptation. This also means, however, that one should be wary about toll analysis
simulations where the only choice dimension is route adaptation – or in more general: As
long as certain choice dimensions that are enacted in response to tolls are not included in
the simulation models, the results may not be very useful.
An advantage of the agent-based approach is that the simulation and the appraisal are
automatically consistent. Assume, for the purpose of illustration, that a toll is introduced
for a fast facility, but that the facility can be circumvented by using a slower and non-
tolled facility. Assume furthermore that the value of time is set to a small value in the
simulation, but to a large one in the appraisal. In that situation, in the simulation much
traffic would be diverted around the toll facility, since most travelers would rather spend
more time than pay money. In the economic appraisal, however, that loss in time would
be weighted very heavily. The result would be wrong, because if the travelers would use
the larger value of time in the simulation, they would rather pay the toll and save time,
thus making them better off. This example is arguably a bit trivial, but it is easy to design
examples where such “incentive mismatches” can happen quite easily. In fact, the issue of
the schedule delay, included in the simulation but excluded from current appraisal meth-
ods, is one example.
A similar consistency argument is made by de Jong et al. (2005), where it is suggested to
use the utility functions estimated for discrete choice models (or more precisely the ex-
pectation value, commonly called the “logsum term”) directly for appraisal. This would
Table 2 Different contributions to the utilities of the agents for the different scenarios if only
route adaptation is permitted
Base case Time toll Difference Distance toll Difference
Number of agents 260,890 260,890 0 260,890 0
Number of paying
agents
0 260,890 260,890 63,510 63,510
Travel time (avg.
per agent, sec.)
3,638 3,630  8 3,670 32
Utility (avg.
per agent, 3)
101.62 89.52  12.10 100.13  1.49
Utilities (sum, 3) 26,511,958 23,354,332  3,157,626 26,122,427  389,530
Toll paid (avg.
per agent, 3)
0.00 12.10 12.10 3.98 3.98
Toll paid (sum, 3) 0.00 3,156,769 3,156,769 253,054 253,054
Utility after redistri-
bution of toll (avg.
per agent, 3)
101.62 101.62  0.003 101.10  0.52
Utility after toll re-
distribution (sum, 3)
26,511,958 26,511,101  857 26,375,482  136,476
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have the same effect as our approach, i.e. that the model that is used for predicting the
behavioral response is the same as the one that is used for evaluation/appraisal. This is
undoubtedly a powerful approach, since it is by now established and common practice to
estimate discrete choice models whereas realistic multi-agent simulations are still a chal-
lenge. The difference is that in our approach, the reactions of the travelers are directly
and microscopically computed. The difference becomes clear when one, say, attempts to
predict the effects of an area toll. In that situation, for the logsum approach it will be
quite difficult to differentiate who will be affected by that toll and to what extent. One
option would be to look at every person separately. Then, however, one ends up very
close to a multi-agent simulation.
Finally, any aggregation by sub-groups is possible since the individual utilities are at-
tached to every individual of the synthetic population, thus allowing filtering and aggre-
gation by arbitrary criteria.
5.4 Discussion of the economic interpretation
Clearly, such an interpretation demands that the utility functions are not only correct for
each individual agent, but that they can be compared between agents. The following
arguments may be brought forward in this context:
– One could argue that it is unfair to just sum up the utilities of all agents. As usual in this
situation, it is always possible to weigh the utility gains of the agents before the sum-
mation according to whatever welfare function is to be optimized.
– One could argue that real people do not systematically optimize any scoring function
at all, but rather do some kind of heuristic symbol processing to move through their
days and lives (Simon 1997, Moss/Sent 1999). In that situation, one could replace the
behavioral logic of our agents with an alternative logic. The simulation would still be
able to predict future outcomes. The indicators, however, would now need to be based
on other principles.
– The approach does not seem to include external effects. However, these could be in-
cluded by computing the emissions caused by the traffic, and then compute the effects
that these emissions have on the agents. Agents could even react to these effects, but
that would be more relevant in the context of urban planning than in transport plan-
ning, e.g. because agents might move their residences to areas that are less impacted by
emissions.
6 Conclusion
It is shown that multi-agent simulations can be used to model people’s reactions to policy
measures in a conceptually straightforward and parsimonious way. In particular, when
the simulated people (¼ agents) optimize individual utility functions, then changes in
these utilities in reaction to a policy change directly measure individual gains or losses.
This makes identifying winners or losers of a policy measure straightforward. Taking
weighted sums over these individual utility changes then leads to aggregate welfare gains
or losses. Since the aggregation is directly taken from the individuals, the weights can be
based on individual demographic or geographic characteristics.
The approach is tested with a multi-agent simulation of traffic and travel behaviour of
the Zurich metropolitan region in Switzerland. As policy, several tolling schemes are
investigated. It is shown that the simulation can be used to model travelers’ reactions
to time-dependent tolls in a way most existing transportation planning tools are not
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able to do. As an example, it is demonstrated that route adjustment only, as is done by
necessity in many traditional transport planning packages, results in no economic gains
from the tolls – this is because the economic effects of tolls often stem from time reactions
and from the elasticity of demand for car traffic. As time-dependent tolls are a much-
debated subject in transportation politics, the ability to fully model such tolls and the
reactions of travellers may help to find better toll schemes.
Overall, multi-agent simulations are able to approach a multitude of questions that cur-
rent transportation tools are not able to answer. In a world where individuals have more
and more freedom to schedule their daily plans, agent-based simulations offer an intui-
tive way to research complex topics with lots of interdependencies.
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